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ABSTRA.CT
This report provides guidance for the preparation of contingency
plans for NASA Data Processing Installations (DPIs). Contingency
plans are necessary for every DPI providing essential ADP support
and are required by OMB Circular A-71, Technical Memorandum No. bbl.
A simple, but 'Khorough, methodology for contingency planning at NASA
Centers is presented. The methodology is flexible enough to allow
managers of ` large and small DPIs to design plans adequate for their
specific needs. The contingency plans are composed of three
separate plans: the Emergency Response, 'Emergency Backup, and
Emergency Recovery Plans. A team concept is presented for meeting
the requirements of each plan. A suggested format is presented for
all three plans, including a description of a common appendix for
the three plans.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Office of Management and Budget (OHB) Circular A-71,
Transmittal Memorandum No. 1, dated Ju,,y 27, 1978, requires all
Executive Branch Departments and Agenci%^s to develop and
implement computer security programs. This document provides
guidelines for developing contingency plans for Data Processing
Installations (DPIs) which is one aspect of NASA's overall
computer security program. It is intended to offer an approach
for providing the DPI manager with a predefined course of
action in the event of a disaster. A contingency plan, to be
comprehensive, must address three elements: ( 1) emergency
response, (2) backup operations, and (3) recovery actions.
Contingency plan documentation should be brief, tested on a
recurring basis, and modified as changes in the data processing
workload dictate.
NASA is well into the computer security program development
phase in compliance with OBM Circular A-il, TMl. NASA
Management Instruction (NMI) 2410.7, "Assuring Security and
Integrity of NASA Data Processing" has been issued; Computer
Security Officials (CSOs) at the Center, DPI, and applications
level have been appointed; Center level management instructions
have been developed; and computer security guidelines have been
f
published to address performance of risk analysis, definition
of security requirements for application software, and
certification of existing sensitive application software.
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In March 1981, the U . S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau
of Standards published, FIPS PUB 87, "Guidelines for ADP
Contingency Planning". FIPS PUB 87 was prepared to provide
management personnel with information on which workable, usable
contingency plans for ADP facilities can be developed and
implemented. This report, based on FIPS 87, presents a
methodology for developing contingency plans which utilizes a
definitive team concept and a documented set of predefined
actions. DPIs, by followa .ng the approaches presented herein,
should be able to develop contingency plans which will:
(1) Minimize the impact and extent of damage to DPI
operations.
(2) Provide an alternative operations strategy in the
event of a disaster.
(3) Provide a systemat^ ,c process for recovery and
restoration of normal operations.
It is recommended that the reader obtain and have available a
copy of FIPS 87. Furthermore, a copy of the Guidelines for
Selection of Backup Strategies (MITRE MTR -82W00204, November
1982) should be used as a companion document throughout the
development of a contingency plan. Additional background
information which may be helpful to the reader is also
available (References 8, 9, and 10).
The guidance provided herein may be modified by the NASA
Centers, individual NASA DPIs or, with NASA approval, by the
contractors who develop contingency plans for NASA DPIs. The
guidance and contingency plan development cycle may also be
modified to suit the specific needs of a DPI, commensurate with
its size, computer configuration, and operations environment.
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1.1 Purvose
The purpose of this document is to provide NASA DPIs with
guidance on preparation of contingency plans which are adequate
to (1) meet Federal and Agency requirements and (2) provide a
realistic, yet cost effective, course of action to meet
disasterous situations. This guidance addresses the
contingency planning needs of all NASA DPIs. The formats
specified, although designed for the larger DPIs, can be
modified to suit the needs of small ones by combining elements
of the plans.
1.2 Scope
The guidelines presented in this document are designed to pla,:
for situations which may result in a major outage caused by
catastroph :Lc fires, earthquakes, bomb explosions, etc. Minor
outages that normally occur on a routine basis, such as a CPU
outage due to "normal" hardware failure, are not addressed by
these guidelines. However, many remedies suggested in the
guidance are applicable to those minor outages. Day-to-day
management practices should be sufficient to handle most
recurring minor problems. This guidance is sufficiently
flexible to allow individual DPIs to adjust the proce
their own needs and specific requirements. For examp
managers of smaller DPIs may reduce the level of deta
small DPI may be thought of as one that uses compute=
larger than an HP-3000 or DEC VAX system.
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1.3 Kev Action Items-in Contingency Plannin
Contingency plan developers must accomplish a series of actions
to a-seure that plans are both comprehensive and ur:able. Lack
of a good plan may ultimately result in minor damage causing
major problems. A good plan, on the other hand, may result in
reducing the losses attendant to a major disaster. The action
items which should be accomplished by contingency plan
developers, maintainers, and managers are:
(1) Document the Existing Environment. Review and
document the current equipment configuration,
identify critical applications, and understand the
risk environment.
(2) Select a Backup Strategy. A thorough understanding
of a previously selected backup strategy is vital to
the contingency plan.
(3) Establish Emergency Response Teams. Specific team
members should be identified. Team assignments must
be documented to ensure that a predefined set of
actions will be accomplished during an actual
emergency situation.
'o	 (4) Develop the Emergency Response Plan. The Emergency
Response Plan details specific: actions to be
accomplished upon discovery of an emergency or
potential emergency.
(5) Develop the Backup Plan. The Backup Plan details the
`; {	 actions to be accomplished when alternate operations
must be initiated following the management decision
s #	 to utilize other than normal data processing
facilities.
k
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(6) Develop the Recovery Plan. This plan identifies the
activities to be performed to resume normal
operj?lions at a primary site.
(7) Develop Test Plan. The test plan should provide for
various types of tests of the contingency plan
elements to ensure that personnel can function
effectively in the event that the plan, or any
portion;, must be activated.
1.4 Overview of the Report
First, an overview of the document and concepts is discussed in
Section 2. Next, team utilization is discussed in Section 3.
Documentation requirements for the plans are presented in
F.,:cion 4. Sections 5, 6 and 7 discuss the three component
plans which comprise the contingency plans document. Finally,
Section 8 deals with plan execution and testing.
7
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2. OVERVIEW OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Contingency planning, frequently referred to as disaster
recovery planning, is an accepted and recommended management
practice. It provides well thought-out responses to preclude
and/or mitigate potentially disruptive events. Contingency
planning is a management control process for anticipating
emergency situations and developing strategies to cope with
those emergencies. Contingency planning should be based on a
risk analysis which identifies critical applications and weighs
the threats and vulnerabilities related to DPI operations.
While the actual content, in terms of level of detail, will
vary between small and large DPIs, the basic planning process
and overall methodology is identical. The concepts and
guidelines presented herein are based on the total destruction
of a large DPI.
2-1
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2.1 Concepts
NBS FIPS PUB 87, "Guidelines for ADP Contingency Planning,"
indicates that:
"A reasonable and systematic approach to contingency
planning and documentation demands adherence to a
carefully conceived structure. This structure is needed
to:
• Assure that all important areas are addressed.
o Permit ease of reference to sections of immediate
interest or concern.
• Facilitate revision by minimizing the effect on
the whole document in limited areas of concern.
Therefore, unless there is a solid Justification for doing
otherwise, the documented plan should be in a loose-leaf
form, highly sectionalized, with each page numbered and
dated and with means provided to identify changes from the
previous version of each page."
The guidance in this document embodies the intent of the
structure discussed in FIPS PUB 87, and is based on four
fundamental concepts which are similar to those presented in
FIPS PUB 87. These four fundamental concepts are:
1. Preliminary planning is the basic driver of actions to
be taken in the succeeding steps and requires:
a. Obtaining management commitment
b. Selection of a backup strategy.
2-2
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2. Establishment of a team structure which serves as a
predefined alternate organization. Each team and its
members must be familiar with their respective
activities, if the contingency plan is to succeed.
3. A set of three plans which specifically support
a. Emergency response operations
b. Backup operations
C. Recovery operations.
4. Devising of test plans which adequately and reliably
exercise the contingency plans. Test plans should be
developed which provide experience to team members.
Testing also should be used to evaluate the procedures
in terms of operational feasibility.
Each of the concepts is essential to the overall workability
and effectiveness of the contingency plan. No one concept is
mare important than the others. The concepts work together and
kollow the flow discussed in the key action items identified in
Section 1.3.
2.2 Preliminary Planning
As indicated above, preliminary planning consists of three
activities; obtaining management commitment, performance of a
risk analysis, and selection of a back-up strategy. Risk
analysis and selection of a backup strategy are the primary
data collection and analysis activities which support the
development and ultimate execution (test or live) of the
contingency plan.
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2.2.1 Management Commitment
ADP facilities provide a vital service to most, if not all,
organizational elements. The senior management of these
facilities must keep the consequences of any loss or damage to
such vital services within tolerable limits. It is incumbent
on management to recognize that their commitment is a key
element in maintaining continuity of ADP operations in an
effective and usable contingency plan. Furthermore, as stated
in FIPS PUB 87:
"Economic feasibility in contingency plans requires
carefully derived decisions as to what organizational
functions are deferrable and for how long."
The responsibility of this commitment is demonstrated in the
following manner:
• Directing the establishment of contingency plans
• Directing the support of the planning process by
organizational units
• Directing the initial and periodic tests of the plan
• Directing the periodic revision and update of the plan
upon the occurrence of changes in facility operations
and at a time commensurate with the risk and magnitude
of loss and harm which could result from disruption of
data processing support
2.2.2 Risk Analysis
Contingency pl-anning should be developed with the full
awareness of those system functions that are supported by ADP
resources. Knowledge of the susceptibility of these ADP
tresources to harm and the consequences therein drive the
contingency plan. Risk analysis is a process which identifies
the areas of potential loss and quantifies the consequences of
loss. Risk analysis provides a basis for the identification,
selection, and cost-justification of potential security
measures to reduce the postulated losses. For further
discussion of risk analysis refer to References 1, 5, 7, and 11.
Risk analysis documentation should provide contingency plan
developers with some basic data needed for the various
documents. Data collection activities generally include the
following:
• Identification of critical applications
• Determination of "vaulting" requirements
• Determination of backup computer equipment
• Identification of supplies and unique resources
• Identification of input/output requirements
• Identification of data or telecommunication
requirements
In the NASA environment, risk analyses are performed on
computer facilities. The risk analysis products most useful to
contingency planning are computer hardware configuration
listings, current off-site storage inventories, listings of
special forms and supplies, and data communication schematics.
The security controls which are recommended for implementation
can also serve to meet security requirements for alternate
(backup) facilities/operatons.
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2.2.3 Selection of Backup Strategy
Utilization of a backup site provides a means of accomplishing
essential data processing tasks, subsequent to disruption of
the ADP operations. Data processing activities performed under
the backup plan continue until the facility is sufficiently
restored or replaced. Backup may involve one or more
strategies (actions). Selection of appropriate backup
strategies is the core of the contingency plan. However,
selecting and documenting the strategy is not sufficient to
assure continuity of ADP operations during emergency or
disaster situations. Once the backup strategy has been
selected, the next step is to establish a team structure.
Detailed guidance on backup strategies can be found in the
"Guidelines For Selection of Backup Strategies" (MTR82WO0204).
2.3 Contingency Plan Teams
A contingency plan, regardless of how well it is structured and
documented, cannot guarantee an effective and efficient
response to an emergency situation. The plan must be executed
by knowledgeable, skilled, and experienced personnel. Without
the necessary people, there can be no recovery. The
organization of personnel into a structure which parallels the
fuactional activities of the DPI is strongly recommended. An
organization such as depicted in Figure 2-1 is suggested as a
minimum team concept.
4
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The Management Team - consists of management personnel
with the authority to enact provisions of the emergency
response plan that have financial, personnel, or
operations related impacts. Section 3.1 provides
additional guidance on the management team.
The Disaster/Recovery Manager - responsible for
coordinating all activities of the Emergency Response
Teams during and immediately following the enactment of
the contingency plan. Section 3.2 provides additional
guidance on the duties of the Disaster/Recovery Manager.
The Input/Output Team - responsible for
assisting retrieving the vital records from the off-site
storage area and establishing and maintaining input/output
operations at the alternate site. Section 3.3 provides
additional guidance on the Input/Output Team.
The User Support Team - responsible for interface between
the user and the alternate DPI operations. Its primary
function is to make users aware that the DPI is operating
under, emergency conditions and assure user satisfaction
under existing constraints. Section 3.4 provides
additional guidance on the duties of the User Support Team.
The aerations Team - responsible for establishing
operational capability of the computer equipment in
conjunction with the Hardware/Software Team and to notify
the Input/Output Team when the DPI is ready to begin or
resume processing. Section 3.5 provides additional
guidance on the duties of the Operations Team.
The Hardware/Software Team - responsible for bringing up
the computer hardware and system software in conjunction
with the Operations Team. Section 3.6 provides a more
detailed discussion of this team's duties.
The Administrative Services Team - responsible for
administrative support tasks such as purchasing, travel,
clerical, and legal/public relations during emergency
operations. Section 3.7 provides more details concerning
the responsibilities of this team.
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The team structure described above is appropriate for large
DPIs. The number of personnel assigned to each team will vary
depending on the size of the DPI. Small ( .g. mini-computer)
DPIs may combine some team functions. In an actual disaster,
some of the primary team members may be incapacitated or unable
to reach the DPI, therefore, alternate personnel should be
assigned to each team.
2.4 Contingency Plan Components
A comprehensive plan of well thought-out procedures for
handling contingency situations should be broken down into
three distinct components: the emergency response plan, the
backup operations plan, and the recovery plan. Figure 2-2
illustrates the relationship of these components.
2.4.1 Emergency Response Plan
The computer center, its equipment, and the operating personnel
are essential to the organization's mission. Emergency
response procedures include the immediate actions to be taken
to protect life and property and to minimize the impact of the
emergency. Section 5 presents a detailed discussion on the
contents of the emergency response plan.
2.4.2 Backup Plan
This plan should describe what must be done to initiate and
effect backup operations. The plan should be based on the
selected backup strategy. Section 6 provides detailed guidance
on developing the backup plan.
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FIGURE 2-2
RELATIONSHIP OF COMPONENT PLANS
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2.4.3 Recovery Plan
The restoration, reconstruction, or new construction of a
computer center is a large, complex project. A recovery plan
should be developed to permit the resumption of normal
operations in the most efficient and cost-effective manner. An
analysis of alternatives should be documented in a recovery
decision document. Section 7 provides additional guidance on
the recovery plan and the attendant recovery decision document,,
2.5 Contingency Plan Execution and Testing
One of the most important aspects of successful contingency
planning is the continued testing and evaluation of the plan.
Test plans should be developed to exercise the plan
thoroughly. Actual tests should be conducted to build
experience in the areas of time response of team members, to
determine weak or inappropriate procedures, and to train newly
assigned personnel. Figure 2-3 illustrates the actual decision
process and how each of the plans described in Section 2.4
relate to the contingency process.
Section 8 provides moin detailed guidance on testing and
execution.
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PROCESS INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS
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3. TEAM UTILIZATION
A team concept has been recommended for implementing the three
component plans. Smaller DPI's may utilize individuals in lieu
of teams to accomplish the same functions performed at larger
DPIs. Team leaders of the various functional areas should be
involved in the definition of functions and responsibilities
for each area. Therefore, team leaders should be chosen early
to assist in the development of contingency plans. Team
leaders and members should be chosen on the basis of expertise
and knowledge of the team's functional area. The team
responsibilities vary across all three compon ,;nt plans and team
size (Figure 3-1 illustrates the relationship of teams to
plans). Items or importance in defining team responsibilities
are as follows: the size of the DPI, the number of
applications run, the backup strategy selected, skill and
availability of personnel, and user service needs. Large DPIs
which function as service bureaus may wish to av gment the teams
with user representatives.
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3.1 Management Team
The management team should be staffed with high level managers
who have either (1) oversight responsibilities for the DPI, (2)
direct management responsibilities f,,,r the DPI, or (3) who
manage user organizations which would be primarily affected by
a DPI outage. Responsibilities for the management team should
include:
•	 Damage Assessment
•	 Decision to Activate Emergency Response, Backup or
Recovery Plans
•	 Activation of the Disaster Recovery Control Center
•	 Management Direction
•	 Monitoring of Recovery Activities
•	 Documentation of Progress and Decisions
The management team works in concert with the disaster/recovery
manager. The disaster/recovery manager should act as an
extension of the management team and operate under the team's
oversight and direction. The size of the management team
should be limited to three to five members. Primary candidates
should include the data processing manager, the computer
operations manager, and the manager of applications software.
3.2 Disaster/Recovery Manager
The disaster/recovery manager is the person with authority and
responsibility to manage disaster/recovery operations. The
five disaster/recovery teams should report directly to this 	 37
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person. The position falls under the policy and management
guidance of the management team. The disaster/recovery manager
is the focal point of the entire disaster /recovery operation.
Both the disas+ter/recovery manager and individual members of
the management ,team should have independent authority to
activate the emergency response plan. However, activation of
the backup and recovery plans should be a joint decision.
3.3 Input/Output Team
The responsibility of the input/output team is to assure
effective input/output operations. All steps necessary for
input/output are the responsibility of this team including
pickup and delivery. Responsibilities of this team should
include the following:
• Retrieving Off Site Data
• Entering Data
• Pickup-Delivery of Input/Output
• Scheduling Data Entry
• Coordinating Input/Output
• Assuring Adequate Input/Output Supplies
• Setting Up Computer Runs
• Handling Forms
• Establishing New Distribution Points
• Maintaining Logs and Schedules
• Distributing Supplies
The input/output team should work closely with the user support
team.
3.4 User Support Team
The user support team serves as the direct interface between
the users and the DPI. Functions for this team should include
the following:
3-4
• Notification of Users About the Disaster
• Maintainance of Priorities for the Applications Runs
• Resolution of User Problems
• Notification to Management about Special User Problems
• Reprioritization of Applications, When Necessary
• Development of Alternative Operation Strategies
• Implementation and Design of New Facilities
• Notification of Vendors
Once the backup plan has been operational for a period of time,
the focus of this team's work will change from user assistance
to new facility design and implementation (see Figure 8-1).
Planning for a new facility is a large task, so this team will
work closely with the hardware/software team which has primary
responsibility for recovery planning and implementation.
3.5 Operations Team
The operations team is responsible for direct operation of the
backup CPU and peripheral equipment. This team works closely
with the hardware/software support team to restore the main
CPU. Specific recommended functions are as follows:
• Activate Backup Facility
• Restore System Software
• Restore Data and Files
• Restore Application Software
• Assure System Integrity
• Restore Data Security Procedu- s and Systems
• Notify User Support and Input/Output Teams When
Operating
• Order Required Supplies
• Operate in Backup Mode Indefinitely
r
3-5
0
The operations team should be staffed with personnel having
systems proQC•atmming, computer Operations, and software
programming experience.
3.6 Hardware/Software Support Team
This team consists of hardware and software specialists. They
work closely with the operations team by providing basic
assistance necessary for operations. Recommended functions for
this team are:
• Assessing Damage to the CPU, Peripheral Equipment, and
System Software
• Establishing Communications Between the Backup Site and
the Users
• Assuring Adequate Job Control Language to Run
Applications
• Assuring Availability of Systems and Application
Software
• Assuring Adequate Documentation is Available
• Conducting Salvage Operations
• Coordinating Recovery Operations
• Planning for New Hardware
• Assisting in Procurement of Hardware
After the backup plan is implemented, this team begins work on
the overall recovery operations effort. This team has primary
responsibility for coordination of recovery activities. It
works closely with the user support team and the administrative
service team.
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3.7 Administrative Service Team
The administrative service team provides the major
administrative support services for the overall
disaster/recovery operations. Functions may be assigned to
individuals with direct authority in these areas, or may be
coordinated through individuals with other organizational
components having authority. The basic functions are:
• Security, Safety, Medical, Damage Containment
• Purchasing, Supplies, Contracts
• Travel, Transportation
• Legal/Public Relations
• Clerical Support
• Personnel
• Facilities, Communications (Phones)
• Services for Recovery Planning
This team works closely with the disaster/recovery manager to
provide the support services needed for effective emergency,
backup, and recovery operations.
x.
4. DOCUMENTING THE CONTINGENCY PLAN
The format of the contingency plan documentation should be
structured to ensure ease of use and to permit all persons to
become familiar with their respective roles. The first step is
i
to develop a basic outline. NBS FIPS PUB 87, APPENDIX 01;4E,
E
presents an outline with three parts which address preliminary
planning, preparatory actions, and the action plan,
	
	 !
i
respectively. This format corresponds to the discussion
presented in Section 3 of FIPS PUB 87. As an alternative, the
outline presented in Appendix A of this document can be used in
c
developing contingency plans for NASA DPIs. The major
difference between the outlines is that in the FIPS PUB 87 	 k
version the outline is contained within the basic plan
documentation. The outline presented in Appendix A includes
the procedural information in the basic document and places the
data most subject to change in a number of appendices.
A loose-leaf binder, subdivided with tabs, is recommended for
the entire document. Each plan should be designed so that it
can be removed as an entity. All pages should be dated.
Tabular subsections for the teams should include the following
items:
• List(s) of team members and alternates.
• Description of team responsibilities.
• Description of specific procedures to be followed.
• Flow chart(s) of procedures the team must conduct.
• Team modification procedures.
• Check list(s) of tasks to be performed.
• Check list(s) of supplies and resources needed.
• Special descriptions of each team.
"'i
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xThis design will allow team members to be presented with all 	 a
necessary information for their function. Instructions should
be simple and to-the-point. The teams should not be burdened
with too much information.
\7n
4.1 Contingency Plan Appendix
One common appendix for all three plans is recommended. The
appendix should contain the following types of information:
i
• Emergency notification list--names and telephone
numbers for the disaster/recovery manager, fire,
police, etc.
• Master calling lists for team members and alternate
members
• Critical applications lists (See Reference 4)
e Storage retrieval check lists
p;	 • Maps and directions to backup site and operations center
• Hardware/software inventories
• Example forms for procurement, travel, etc.
o Backup supplies check list
o Vendor contacts
!	 • Backup test reports
• Initial meeting places for team members
4-2
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• Facilities, communications, and utilities contracts
• Data entry forms
• Strategy documentation from backup plan (See Reference
4).
• Communications requirements
• Summary of personnel requirements to run backup
operations organization charts
4.2 Distribution
Team members should have portions of each plan applicable to
their specific function so that the team gets an overview of
its own functions across all three plans. Personnel with
oversight responsibility should receive all three complete
plans. Distribution should be limited because security is a
concern and system vulnerabilities can be exploited, if
information in the plans is disclosed.
5. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
The purpose of the Emergency Response Plan is to provide
specific, easy to understand instructions for responding to
emergencies which may cause serious harm or damage. The plan
should not be voluminous, but it should reference sources
necessary for detailed information, where required. As
mentioned previously, this plan is a separate section of the
contingency plans document. Specific subjects which will be
a
	 discussed below in regard to this plan are:
• Purpose
x
	
• Development
,j
• Types of Disasters
• Scenarios
- Decision to Evacuate
- Evacuation Procedures
• Notification Process
• Computer Power-Down Procedures
• Damage Containment
• Decision to Implement the Backup Plan
• Securing the DPI
5.1 Development
This plan should be developed in concert with center level
security personnel. Many of the emergency procedures
pertaining to each DPI will be strongly influenced by policy
and procedures developed by safety/security personnel with
5-I
oversite for each center. External agencies such as GSA and
the Federal Protective Service may have responsibilities
affecting this plan. Therefore, a first step in the
development is to get input from the center security/safety
officers.
5.2 Emergency Detection
An emergency situation must first be detected before a response
can be initiated. Other than a sudden, unpredictable natural
disaster like an earthquake, many disasters are reported or
forecast on the news media. In cases where advance notice is
given, responsibility for monitoring the news is usually
delegated to full—time security personnel. As part of the
installation notification process for the center,"provision
should be made for these personnel to notify the DPI Computer
Security Official, disaster/recovery manager member of the
management team, or other appropriate official directly.
Other disasters may occur without warning. This type of
disaster, such as a fire or water damage, may be detected by
personnel or by detection systems. Such systems may have local
and remote reporting capabilities. The type of detection
systems may include the following:
e Intrusion
o Closed Circuit TV
o Heat
o Smoke
o Water
'1^^
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Once a system is activated, procedures for notification of 	 r
q	 appropriate security/management personnel and evacuation, etc.,
i
should be clearly specified and posted in the DPI.
5.3 Emergency Response Scenarios
Emergency response procedures will depend on the type of
emergency at hand, e.g., a minor fire will certainly require a
different response than a bomb threat. The DPI emergency plan
may include specific responses for the following types of
situations:
v Minor Fire
o Major Fire
o Bomb Threat
o Major Storm or Earthquake
e Flood
The specific scenarios included or added to the above list will
depend on the DPI itself.. Each scenario should include the
specific steps involved in responding to each type of
emergency. The steps involved may vary from notification of	 -
the disaster/recovery manager to immediate evacuation of the
DPI
The decision to evacuate should be assigned to management team
members, the disaster/recovery manager, or appropriate safety
personnel. The responsibility for making such a decision
should be clearly shown in the plan. Personnel who are likely
to be acting for officials in their absence should also be
1	 f
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listed. During after hours operation, the responsibility
should be delegated to the managers, safety officials, or
supervisors on duty at the time of the emergency situation.
Both on-duty and off-duty phone numbers for these officials
should be included. The decision to evacuate may also be made
by "other" authorities having ,jurisdiction over the center such
as the GSA, Federal Protective Service, or local police and
fire officials.
5.4 Notification Process
Once the evacuation decision is made, the plan should clearly
outline the process for notifying employees, team members, and
users. A suggested notification sequence is as follows:
responsible management officials should be notified first;
supervisors should b: notified next who should, in turn, notify
employees and team members; team members will notify users. In
situations where the evacuation decision is made by DPI or
center personnel, procedures for notification of non-NASA
authorities should be specified clearly.
As mentioned earlier, phone numbers for management and DPI
security officials both for after-Hours and office hours should
be included in the plan appendix along with alternates who may
be in charge. The management official responsible for
activation of the emergency response plan should notify the
disaster/recovery teams. In order to expedite notification, a
calling tree may be used.
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I5.5 Computer Power-Down Procedures
In certain emergencies, the computer systems should be
powered-down and shut off, and the operations personnel should
evacuate the building. If the emergency occurs in or directly
effects the computer room, emergency shut down procedures
should be employed. If there is a threat to life, all
personnel should be evacuated immediately. The protection of
the equipment is secondary to the protection of life. Computer
system manuals needed as references to power-up and power-down
the computer should be stared in the computer center and at the
off-site backup records storage facility (in case the on-site
copy is destroyed).
5.6 Damage Containment
Steps and equipment necessary to contain and limit damage in an
emergency situation may be specified in the DPI Risk Analysis.
If not, these procedures should be defined and equipment
necessary to reduce security vulnerabilities should be provided.
Containment process activities for each situation will depend
on the nature of the emergency. Step-by-step procedures for
the various types of emergencies should be specified. For
example, in the case of 'a small fire in a piece of hardware the
following scenario may apply:
1. Turn off the hardware
2. Use a Halon or can fire extinguisher on the fire
3. If the fire is out, notify management and safety
personnel
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4. If the fire is not out,
activate room halon system, if not already activated
- pull fire alarm
- leave area
- evacuate the building
5. Notify the management team.
In other cases, such as a slowly leaking rooms, covering
hardware with plastic sheeting and powering down may be an
adequate procedure.
5.7 Derision to Implement the Backup Plan
i
a
Once the DPI has been evacuated, a preliminary assessment of
damage should be conducted by the management team and/or
t
disaster/recovery manager. Based on the damage surfaced by
this assessment, a decision on whether or not to activate the
backup plan will be made. If the decision is made to do so,
the security of the installation should be considered.
5.8 Securing the DPI
Damage to a particular DPI may be such that extra security
should be taken immediately to protect hardware, software, and
data. It may be necessary to provide guards around the clock 4
until security measures can be adjusted to compensate for the 	 C
emergency situation. The DPI computer security official should
be part of the damage assessment team. Based on damage
assessment decisions made, he should decide whether or not to
increase security measures at the installation to compensate
for the outage.
l
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6. BACKUP PLAN
The backup plan is the main portion of the contingency plan
document. Specific concerns which will be discussed for backup
plans in the following sections are:
• Role of Backup Strategy Documentation
• Notification, Assembly Points, and Directions
• Team Functions
• Emergency Operations Center
e Plan Operation
• Closing the Backup Center
DPIs should design their plans based on their unique needs.
The backup plan should evolve from the previously documented,
a
backup strategy. Data used to document the backup strategies
should be obtained.
6.1 Role of Backup Strategies Documentation
The documentation developed for backup strategy selection is
the core around which the backup plan is constructed. For,the
purpose of de,;-eloping the backup plan, it should be assumed
that a large DPI is totally destroyed. Documentation should
specify a backup strategy with an operational, alternate backup
facility available to run applecations immediately. Backup
plans developed for strategies different from this example
would also be different in structure. Backup strategy
documentation should be included as an appendix to the
contingency plans document.
tf
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6.2 Notification, Assembly Points, and Directions
In the case of a disaster, the disaster/recovery manager and the
management team decide on implementation of the backup plan. The
decision is based on the initial damage assessment conducted as part
of the emergency response plan. Once the backup plan is initiated,
team leaders must be notified that the plan is in effect. To
accomplish this, call lists for team leaders and team members should
be included as an appendix.
Each team section of the backup plan should indicate assembly points
for team members. Exact directions, with maps, should be provided
to allow team members to respond quickly.
6.3 Additional Functions of the Backup Teams
The recommended functions -or the various teams have been discussed
previously. However, there are several additional specific items
which are recommended to assist teams in performance of backup
operations. These items should be included under the team sections
of the backup plan:
• Team Member Lists
• Notification Process when Feasible
• Check Last Procedures for Functions Assigned to the Team
Check lists and procedures to assist team functions should be
developed in advance. Functions which can be easily reduced to a
check list format include transportation, notification, damage
assessment, backup site activation procedures, and material
6-2
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resources check lists. However, complex functions may not be
reducable to a checklist format. In this case, the DPI must rely on
the expertise of personnel assigned to those functions.
6.4 Decision Points and Backup Plan Operation
The sequence of events in the model plan shown in Figure 8-1 is
designed to obtain operational capability within 24 hours of a
disaster. At this point, a decision should be made by the
management team as to whether or not to continue the backup plan.
Assumirg operations do continue, a second decision will be made on
implementation of the recovery plan. (This should occur sometime
between 3 days and 7 days after implementation of the backup plan.)
The backup plan should be designed to operate on an indefinite
basis, i.e., 3 to 6 months.
6.5 Emergency Operations Center
An emergency operations center should be selected. The emergency
operations center is the management and administration command
center for backup operations. Two alternatives are as follows: (1)
it could beat or near the backup site, or (2) it may be located
elsewhere. In the second case, if tb- backup site is remotely
located, it may be desirable to have the operations center in the
vicinity of the original DPI.
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Also, close proximity of the emergency operations center to the
original DPI will permit users to coordinate I/O for backup
operations. Furthermore, a nearby location will be very useful in
the reconstruction process in which direct control of backup
operations will be more feasible. After opening the emergency
center, communication should be established through phones and data
links as soon as possible. In addition, office furniture and
supplies will be needed for the teams.
6.6 Closing the Backup Center
Procedures for closing the backup site and switching over to the new
I	 or reconstructed center should be clearly defined for each team.
Possible alternatives include: (1) gradual cut-over, and (2) dead
stop--hot start. For larger systems, a gradual cutover is
recommended because of the complexities of getting a new DPI
on-line. Smaller systems may be able to utilize the second
alternative for off-the-shelf systems. Each team's function in this
plan will vary and may not be subject to exact prior definition.
The disaster/recovery manager should manage this transition in
coordination with the DPI staff to assure efficiency and
effectiveness in the transfer of operations.
6-4
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7. RECOVERY PLAN
G
;x
The recovery plan addresses major functions which must be conducted
in order to resume normal operations at a primary site. It is
documented in the same way as the other plans with tabs for team
tasks, etc.
Considerations for recovery from a total outage will be discussed in
this section. The options available vary according to the extent of
the disaster because of the nature of recovery operations. Thus, a
lesser outage will require less work to recover, even though the
disaster /recovery manager may have a comprehensive plan available.
The recovery plan centers around the development of a recovery
decision document. This is a separate document which will be
developed by teams during implementation of the recovery plan. Once
a decision is made to implement the recovery plan, * the actual
recovery decision document should be developed under the direction
of the disaster/recovery manager in concert with the
hardware /software, the user support, and administrative teams.
Elements which should be addressed in the recovery decision document
are as follows:
• Recovery Options
• Management Constraints
• Recovery Decision
• Environmental Requirements
• Hardware Requirements
• Software Requirements
7-1
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Each of these elements will be discussed in the subsections below.
7.1 Recovery Options
Several alternatives should be considered in developing the recovery
decision document: damaged hardware may be (1) repaired, (2)
replaced one-for-one, or (3) upgraded. An influencing factor on
which of these to implement is the position taken by vendors. Many
vendors that lease to the government have insurance on the
equipment. Therefore, the vendor may choose to replace the
equipment directly or to offer incentives to upgrade to newer
equipment.
7.2 Management Constraints
Management constraints may affect the selection of a recovery
option. These constraints include the following:
• Cost Benefit
lease
- purchase
• Timeframes
- application requirements
- hardware delivery
• System Software and Applications Software Interface Problems
• Resources
- budget
- manpower
In the above list, the budget constraints may be the most difficult
obstacle. Large dollar amounts may be difficult to obtain in a
short timeframe because of the budget cycle. Budgeting
reallocation, however, may be a viable alternative to consider.
7-2'
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Furthermore, operating system upgrades may be difficult, especially
if there is a large investment in system dependent software.
7.3 Recovery Decision
The recovery decision should be made as early as possible. A
separate decision document should be prepared for management which
discusses the positive and negative aspects of the options and
constraints above. This document, developed during implementation
of the recovery plan, should be prepared by the disaster/recovery
manager for the signature of the management team or an appropriate
management official. Alternatives should be listed and
recommendations should be made.
Once management approval is obtained, the disaster/recovery manager
should coordinate implementation action with the management teams
involved in this plan (see Figure 8-1). Items discussed in the
following three subsections are important for implementation of a
major DPI repair and/or construction program.
7.4 Environmental Requirements
Some of the major environmental requirements which must be
considered for recovery of a large DPI are as follows:
• Hardware Spacing
Y Cooling
- Air conditioning
- Chilled water
e Raised Floors
e Electrical Power and Lighting
7-3
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• Office Space and Equipment
• Physical Security
• Schedule to Complete Construction
A more comprehensive list of requirements can be developed from FIPS
PUBS 31, 65, 73, and 87 or vendor information. For example, one
vendor offers a course in laying out a design for a computer
center. Other types of outside assistance may also be available.
7.5 Hardware Requirements
Some of the elements that the hardware/software team should consider
for the recovery process are:
• Hardware Specifications
• Service Contracts
• Delivery and Installation Schedules
• Application Software Conversion Problems Due to System
Differences
• Schedules to Complete Installation
• Schedules to Complete Testing
If a system upgrade is involved, special consideration should be
given to application interface problems. Hardware performance will
have to be performed following NASA and Federal regulations.
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7.6 Software Requirements
A new full-performance system should run applications software as
efficiently and effectively as the original system. Special
concerns for software are:
• Full operating system testing before going on-line
• Interface parameter difficulties for applications and sub-
systems when changes are made
• Change-over procedures f.ir running applications when
activating the new DPI
• Software security specifications
The software life-cycle processes described in FIPS PUB 38 and 73
are directly applicable to these requirements. A more comprehensive
list is included in this document, and it is suggested that the FIPS
73 be available for use during the recovery.
7.7 Recovery Guidance Summary
The recovery plan is less structured than the emergency response or
backup plans. This is because it is effected by the extent of the
disaster and the recovery options selected from the recovery
decision document. Therefore, the recovery plan is a "plan for a
plan." It should be designed to put a mechanism in place to develop
an adequate recovery decision document for management, (see section
7.3) and implement management's recovery decision. Background
information should be available to assist the teams in
implementating their emergency response tasks. The disaster/
recovery manager should work closely with the management team to
assure effective implementation of the decision document.
t
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89 CONTINGENCY PLAN EXECUTION AND TESTING
The final test of the viability of the Contingency Plan is the
execution of the plan (or portions) as the result of an actual
emergency. Figure 8-1, provides, as a sample situation, an estimate
of the elapsed time that might be experienced under very ideal
conditions. However, since each organization is unique in
structure, personnel and geographic environment, each DPI should
conduct a number of tests to establish their own time baseline. A
general description of the execution process is discussed in Section
8.1. Section 8.2 describes a series of tests which range from low
or no-cost to those which will require expenditure of some budgetary
resources. It is recommended that all tests be documented and the
results maintained by the disaster/recovery manager.
An example can be postulated to illustrate the ste ps involved in
plan execution and estimates of time-phasing. In the example shown
in Figure 8-1, it is assumed that (1) a large DPI is totally
destroyed, and (2) it will take approximately three months to
reconstruct the damaged center, and (3) an operational backup site
is available based on a documented strategy. The Figure shows how
the plans interrelate once execution is initiated.
8.1 Time Phasing of Plan Execution
Approximately 15 minutes after a disaster, the emergency response
plan can be activated as shown in the Figure. Within three hours of
the disaster, team members have assembled and assessed the damages
in conformance with tasks and instructions in the contingency
plans. After the assessment, a decision can be made on
8-1
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implementation of the backup plan. When the backup plan is
activated, the full alternate organization, i.e., the team
structure, becomes fully operational. Teams that are not already
functional assemble at predetermined points and begin performing
functions outlined in the backup plan.
Seventy-two hours to one week later, a decision to implement the
Recovery Plan can be made based on the situation at that time. If
the decision to implement the Recovery plan is made, the user
support, hardware/software and administrative service teams shift
their functions. Although some backup function will continue to be
performed by these teams, they will begin functions necessary to
recovery. During this time frame the recovery decision document
should be developed to provide management with a decision document
and an,implementation process to effect recovery. Figure 8-1
further illustrates that, after approximately three months, the
damaged site has been reconstructed and operations are transferred
back from the backup site. Each DPI should construct a similar
time-phase chart to integrate team functions suitable for execution
of-the DPI's plans. This chart should be included in the
introductory portion of the contingency plans documentation.
8.2 Testing the Backup Plan
To ensure that the contingency plans will be most useful in coping
with a disaster, various parts of the plan should be exercised and
refined on an annual basis. This section presents five basic levels
of drills that should be performed to test the contingency plans.
They are:
Level 1 Test - Verification of emergency response team
member alternate phone number.
t ' 	 f
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Level 2 Test - Dete .mine response time and emergency operations
center rea iness.
Level 3 Test - Determine readiness of off-site storage.
Level 4 Test - Run a selected critical system at the
alternate backup site.
Level 5 Test - Simulate a major disaster and activate the
emergency response procedures.
The following sections describe the checklist items which must be
observed during each type of test. Results from these tests should
be evaluated and used to refine the emergency plans. Note that in
this discussion, personnel are identified in terms of their
"emergency only" job titles.
8.2.1 Level 1 Test - Verification of Team Member Phone Numbers
The emergency response team member /alternate phone number lists
should be periodically verified. The following questions concerning
these lists should be checked every 3 to 6 raonths to ensure that
adequate key personnel are available to respond to an emergency
situation.
1) Is the backup personne l list available for verification?
2) Are personnel currently assigned to each of the
member /alternate slots in the team roster?
3) Are all those people currently employed at the DPI?
4) Is there a documented notification procedure?
5) Using these procedures, is it possible to contact all the
team members/alternates by phone either at work or at home?
6) Was everyone contacted aware of his or her role on the team
and the procedure for initial assembly of the group?
8-6
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Any new information gathered during any segment of the tests should
be incorporated into the plan and all copies of the plan revised
accordingly. It should be verified that there are enough current
copies of the plan at all times to support operations after an
emergency. Copies of the plan should be distributed as follows:
a) A copy in the office and another in the home of the
Disaster/Recovery Manager and his alternate
b) One at the off-site storage facility
c) Oue at the backup processing site
The address, phone number, and directions to both the off-site
sto:-age facility and the backup site should be in the emergency
plans and should be checked annually. In addition, police, fire
:department, rescue squad, building security, gas company, water
company, electric company, telephone company, etc. phone numbers
should be included in the plan and should be checked periodically.
8.2.2 Levu 2 Test - Check Response Time and Emergency Operations
Center Readiness
The level 2 test is run to verify that the personnel shown on the
notification lists test actually know where they are supposed to go
and how long it takes to get there. Team members should be quizzed
on individual responsibilities and what should be supplied t%
accomplish the next steps. Small informal meetings should be held
with each of the individual task force teams. These meetings should
consist of question and answer type drills between the team members
and the emergency response coordinator. Level 2 testing should be
accomplished at least once per year*
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An office area with desks, chairs, telephones, and some basic
supplies ahould be designated as the Emergency Operations Center
from which all of the emergency operations are managed. A primary
and secondary emergency operations center should be designated in
advance.	 Street addresses, directions, and phone numbers of each
should be documented in the plan.
After an emergency has occurred and the computer center has been
secured, the emergency task force teams should meet at a prearranged
point before traveling to the various facilities to do their jobs.
Initial meeting points should be determined in advance. A third
level backup meeting p.u,.,e may be needed in case of wide spread
disaster. All meeting points should be documented.
The emergency response management team should be quizzed to verify
that each team member knows how to locate a copy of the emergency
plan. Then a copy of the plan should be provided and the team asked
what Lliey would do given a particular disaster scenario (say total
destruction by tornado or fire), how long it would be expected to
take, and what would be needed to do it. This approach should
reveal any shortcomings in the ;following three major areas:
a) Does everyone know where the plans are kept?
b) Does everyone know what information is contained in the
plans?
c) Is the information appropriate (too much, not enough,
inaccurate, etc)?
8--8
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In particular, this exercise with the management team should check
the following items:
a) Have initial meeting places and,emergency operations
centers been formally designated?
b) Have the addresses, phone numbers, and directions to each
of these been documented in the plan?
c) Are the telephones, desks, chairs, office space, and backup
supplies at each of the emergency operations centers
adequate for the given scenario?
d) Are these items currently in place and ready for emergency
operations at the centers?
Next, the team responsible for damage assessment should be asked to
submit a dummy damage assessment report to see if it contains
adequate detail and is in understandable format. The ot-her teams
should be assembled and quizzed in a similar manner, given an
assumed scenario and the damage assessment obtained above.
8.2.3 Level 3 Test - Determine Readiress of Off-Site Storage
A test should be conducted to test the response time for an
emergency run to the off-site storage and to verify the completeness
of those records and supplies.
Using the list of files developed by the Disaster/Recovery Manager
under level 2 tests and a list of supplies, the input/output team
should be transported to the storage facilities to pull the files
and supplies which should be loaded and taken to the backup facility.
This test should be timed. The results should be used to refine the
task timings for these and related tasks in the emergency plan.
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The adequacy of the file and supplies backup listings and procedures
can be verified and refined as necessary using this test. Also, the
ease of making transportation arrangements can be judged. Any
weaknesses found in the timing estimates, procedures, or information
contained in the plan should be identified and corrected.
8.2.4 Level 4 Test - Run a Critical System at the Backup Site
Extending the prior test to the next step, the pulled files and
supplies should actually be used to set up and process a selected
critical application system at the backup site. The backup
processing capability needed for a complete run should be thoroughly
tested at the backup site. A level 4 test should be done twice per
year after the Emergency Response Plan is in place.
At the end of this exercise, the following major questions need to
be addressed:
1) Did all personnel know where to go and what to do?
2) Is there a contract for the backup site?
3) Were the hours/days required available?
4) Was the computer size and memory capability compatible?
5) Were all the proper files present?
6) Were there adequate scratch tapes?
7) Were the tape drives density, tracks compatible?
8) Were there sufficient tape racks available?
9) Was there a tape storage safe/vault?
10) Was there enough disk space?
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11) Were the disk types sufficient, compatible?
12) Were the supplies adequate?
13) Were the proper authorizations obtained from software
vendors to move proprietary packages to the backup site?
14) Was there a. 24 hour telephone line operating?
15) Was there sufficient work area?
16) Were the phone numbers of the backup site manager and
vendor available, correct?
17) Does the backup site provide computer support personnel -
operators, computer engineers, analysts, etc.?
18) Did all other hardware and computer peripheral devices
function properly?
19) Was the run successful or did it experience problems not
usually encountered when the processing is done at the
primary computer centers?
20) What were the problems and what procedures should be
changed to correct the problem?
8.2.5 Level 5 Test - Simulate a Major Disa ater and Activate the
Emergency Response Plan
The only way to reasonably ensure that the plan is adequate and
proper is to simulate a major disaster; activate the plan; shut down
the computer center; evacuate; and move to the backup site. This is
usually expensive, but it is a very effective tool for testing the
plan. It is also a good technique for engraining security and
safety consciousness in all employees. Testing is also a good
mechanism to indicate to all employees that the computer security 	 i
program is fully supported by management. It is recommended that
this test be run once a year.
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8.3 Summary
One of the most important aspects of successful contingency
preplanning management is the continued testing, evaluation, and
updating of the contingency plan. Each significant change in the
operating environment, whether organization structure, hardware, or
operating procedures, must be reviewed for its impact upon the
contingency plan.
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